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The Use of Risk Assessment in Sentencing 
Esther F.J.C. van Ginneken  
 
A Brief History of Risk Assessment in Sentencing 
 
Over the years, risk, as the likelihood of future criminal behaviour, has played a role in 
sentencing in different forms and at different stages in the criminal justice process. A general 
shift can be observed from a welfare-oriented approach to a neoliberal approach, with a 
declining role for (clinical) experts and a shift of responsibilities from state authorities to the 
individual (Garland 2001; Feeley and Simon 1992). However, it would be amiss to paint this 
development with a broad brush only, as there is substantial variation in practice across 
jurisdictions. This chapter discusses these variations in current and (recent) past practices of 
risk-based sentencing and also gives an overview of the main debates around risk assessment. 
Many of these debates will be examined in more detail in the chapters that follow.  
The development of risk assessment instruments over time can be aligned with 
changes in their function in the criminal justice process. The previous century witnessed the 
popularity and subsequent decline of the rehabilitative ideal, which was followed by a greater 
prominence of retributive (deserved punishment) and crime control concerns. Today, risk 
assessment may be said to serve the primary function of efficient offender management, 
although there is also still attention for rehabilitative, retributive and incapacitative goals. 
 
First Generation: Clinical Judgement and Penal Welfarism 
 
In the heyday of the rehabilitative ideal (roughly the 1950s and 1960s, beginning its descent 
in the 1970s), it was generally believed that the causes of criminality could be ‘diagnosed’ 
and ‘treated’ using an individual approach (Phelps 2011). Consequently, many offenders 
received indeterminate sentences that were terminated upon the apparent rehabilitation (and 
thus low risk) of the individual. This put a great deal of sentencing discretion at the back-door 
with parole boards, as judges would only impose a sentencing range or maximum sentence. 
These judgements by parole boards about rehabilitation (i.e. future dangerousness) were 
normally informed by clinical assessments of dangerousness, which were not restricted by 
rules or guidelines about the use of information to reach decisions. Unstructured clinical risk 
assessments are considered the first generation of risk instruments and they have been 
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criticised for their lack of reliability and predictive validity (Hanson and Morton-Bourgon 
2009; Monahan 1981).  
 
Second Generation: Actuarial Assessment and Selective Incapacitation 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, dissatisfaction with the rehabilitative potential of prison programmes 
as well as critiques on indeterminate sentencing contributed to a shift towards determinate 
sentencing on the basis of retributive and crime control considerations. As part of a large 
research programme funded by the US National Institute of Justice, a 1982 RAND study 
claimed that crime could be reduced through selective incapacitation of offenders who are 
most likely to reoffend (Greenwood and Abrahamse 1982). The study’s authors had identified 
correlates of self-reported offending frequency through a survey of prisoners convicted of 
robbery and burglary and advocated the use of an actuarial tool that used these correlates, to 
identify high-rate offenders (for a discussion of methodological and ethical problems, see 
Auerhahn 1999). The idea of selective incapacitation chimes with the notion that a high 
proportion of crimes are committed by a small proportion of the most prolific offenders 
(Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin 1972). However, even selective incapacitation may incur higher 
costs than the benefits gained from the crimes it prevents (Blokland and Nieuwbeerta 2007). 
A defining characteristic of second generation risk assessment instruments is that they 
only include static factors: these factors are fixed and unamenable to intervention (e.g. age at 
first arrest and number of prior convictions). These instruments are actuarial risk assessments 
in the sense that they calculate risk based on a formula, which may be a regression equation or 
simple adding of points, and can combine more information than the typical human expert 
(but see Dressel and Farid 2018). A widely used second generation instrument is the Static-99 
for predicting sexual offending. This instrument consists of ten items, including age, offence 
history, victim typology and whether the offender lives with a partner. A total risk score is 
calculated by adding points for each risk factor, where a total score of 6 or more (range 0-12) 
is labelled ‘high risk’. The initial validation study found a violent recidivism rate of 59% after 
15 years for sex offenders who fell in this high risk category (Hanson and Thornton 1999). 
One of the prime criticisms launched at the early actuarial tools was that they had a 
high false-positive rate, i.e. non-recidivists classified as high risk. To some extent, this was 
remedied by later actuarial tools that used a probabilistic model to estimate the likelihood of 
future offending. Actuarial risk assessments compare an individual’s characteristics to a 
reference group and calculated risk scores reflect the degree of similarity between an 
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individual and a group: a high-risk offender basically shares many characteristics with past 
recidivists and a low-risk offender shares many characteristics with past non-recidivists. 
While this conveys a level of uncertainty, these risk scores still inform decisions that have the 
same consequences as false positives and false negatives associated with dichotomous 
categorisation.  
  In the 1990s there was growing attention to danger and risk in society more generally 
(Giddens 1990; Beck 1992), which manifested itself in the criminal justice domain as a 
preoccupation with risk assessment and management (Feeley and Simon 1992). Yet, the 
‘promise’ of actuarial justice and risk assessment to enhance administrative efficiency (Feeley 
and Simon 1992; 1994) did perhaps not materialise to the extent envisioned until much more 
recently (Rothschild-Elyassi, Koehler and Simon forth). The 1990s bore witness to rising 
crime rates, the introduction of tougher sentences, as well as rapidly growing prison 
populations. The new generation of risk assessment challenged the dominant focus on 
punitive responses and incapacitation to some extent by a greater focus on treatment potential. 
 
Third and Fourth Generation: Risk-Needs Assessment and Offender Management 
 
The Risk-Needs-Responsivity (RNR) model (Andrews and Bonta 2010) forms the theoretical 
foundation from which third and fourth generation of structured professional risk assessments 
have been developed. Third generation risk assessment instruments include static and 
dynamic factors, where dynamic factors (sometimes called ‘needs’) can change over time or 
through intervention. This new generation of instruments targets some of the shortcomings of 
first and second generation risk assessments, which were less reliable (particularly 
professional judgements) and, in the case of second generation instruments, did not allow for 
improvements (i.e. decreases) in risk, because they were based on static factors.  
The RNR model outlined the principles for successful interventions in combination 
with risk assessment. First, the level of treatment should be proportionate to the risk of 
reoffending (risk principle); this means that offenders with a low risk of reoffending are not 
unnecessarily targeted for intervention. Secondly, interventions should target criminogenic 
needs, or dynamic factors that are correlated with recidivism (needs principle). Here, Andrews 
and Bonta (2010) distinguished between criminogenic needs (e.g. pro-criminal attitudes and 
substance abuse) and non-criminogenic needs (e.g. self-esteem and major mental disorder). 
Thirdly, interventions should incorporate effective cognitive social learning strategies and 
tailor them to a person’s learning style. Briefly, it could be said that risk refers to who should 
5 
 
be treated, needs to what should be treated, and responsivity to how to treat. The RNR-based 
risk assessment instruments are thus used not only to predict risk, but also to assist in 
reducing it. 
Structured professional risk assessments are a combination of clinical judgement and 
actuarial risk assessment, although they are often carried out by non-clinical professionals 
(e.g. probation officers). They provide guidance on which risk factors to take into 
consideration and how to score them, but also allow a degree of professional discretion in the 
assessment and weighing of certain indicators of risk (and even overrides in the final 
recommendation). These structured professional risk assessments are often also used to keep a 
record of progression throughout the completion of a sentence. The development of third 
generation instruments into fourth generation instruments is characterised by the combination 
of risk assessment with offender management, and the incorporation of the responsivity 
principle. Fourth generation instruments are designed to guide supervision, intervention and 
release decisions from intake through case closure (Andrews, Bonta and Wormith 2006). 
 A typical example of a third generation instrument is the Level of Service Inventory-
Revised (LSI-R), which is used on a large scale in Canada and the US, and was developed and 
tested by Andrews and Bonta (1995). It comprises of 54 items across 10 domains: criminal 
history, education/employment, financial, family/marital, accommodation, leisure/recreation, 
companions, alcohol/drug problems, emotional/personal, and attitudes/orientation. Similar 
instruments are used in England and Wales (Offender Assessment System, OASys) and other 
European countries (e.g. Risk Assessment Scales, RISc, in the Netherlands). The LSI-R was 
later revised into a fourth generation instrument, the Level of Service/Case Management 
Inventory (LS/CMI; Andrews, Bonta and Wormith 2004), which – among other changes – 
includes additional non-scored sections that provide qualitative information that may be 
relevant for offender supervision and treatment; it further allows the test administrator to 
designate a subcomponent as ‘strength’, which could also inform an offender’s case plan.  
The LSI-R has strong advocates as well as fierce critics. There are numerous studies in 
support of the utility of the LSI-R in predicting recidivism (Gendreau, Little and Goggin 
1996; Vose, Cullen and Smith 2008). Nevertheless, reliability and validity of lengthy 
instruments such as the LSI-R have been questioned; only few of the LSI-R items appear to 
predict recidivism and there are issues with inter-rater disagreement on ratings of items and 
risk level (Austin et al. 2003; Dowdy, Lacy and Unnithan 2001). Static predictors are more 
consistently scored and have higher predictive value. This has prompted suggestions to 
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separate risk predictions from needs assessment and case planning (Baird 2009; Caudy, Durso 
and Taxman 2013; cf Labrecque et al. 2014). 
The developments sketched above cannot simply be characterised as an increase in 
punitiveness: on the one hand, risk assessments are used to identify high-risk offenders and 
subject them to greater control and often long-term incarceration, on the other hand, they are 
also used to identify low-risk offenders and divert them from prison. It is recognised that 
imposing control and interventions on low-risk offenders may actually have adverse effects. 
Furthermore, later generation instruments explicitly regard the offender as capable of change 
and are used to inform ‘treatment’ (perhaps not the most fitting term for the dominant 
cognitive behavioural interventions on offer, see Duguid 2000: 197). It may therefore be more 
appropriate to speak of a hybrid model of penology (see for example Hannah-Moffat 2005; 
O’Malley 1999), which combines different aims of sentencing including rehabilitation, rather 
than of a ‘new penology’ of actuarial justice, as characterised by Feeley and Simon (1992; 
1994). 
 
Issues around the Use of Risk Assessment in Sentencing 
 
The use of risk assessment in sentencing has been criticised on various grounds, including 
empirical concerns about validity and normative concerns about fairness. This section will 





One the most prominent and elaborately discussed criticisms of risk-based sentencing is its 
violation of retributive norms of proportionality. Just deserts theory holds that the severity of 
a punishment should correspond to the seriousness of the offence, which comprises harm and 
culpability (Von Hirsch 1976). Retributive sentencing is thus backward-looking. Risk 
assessment brings concerns about the future into calculations of sentence severity, which 
means that offenders who have committed crimes of equal seriousness may receive 
differential sentences, based on future risk. Although, arguably, even within a retributive 
framework it is possible to envisage differential sentences for equally serious crimes, 
responsive to risk (Ryberg, Chapter 4 in this volume). There is debate among retributivist 
scholars on whether it is justified to consider prior convictions in sentencing (Lee 2010; Von 
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Hirsch 2010; Bagaric 2001). Risk-based sentencing is more compatible with utilitarian 
approaches to punishment, in particular to advance the aim of crime control through 
incapacitation of high-risk offenders or risk reduction by targeted intervention.  
A related concern is that the use of risk assessment in sentencing in effect holds 
offenders responsible for factors that are static (e.g. age and gender) or are often outside their 
direct control (e.g. employment). Tonry (2014: 171) notes, ‘there is something fundamentally 
unethical or immoral about apportioning punishments or other intrusions on liberty on the 
basis of ascribed characteristics for which no coherent argument can be made that offenders 
bear personal responsibility for them.’ To the extent that variable risk factors are a choice, it is 
still problematic to attach penal consequences to lawful life choices. 
 So far, however, the use of risk assessment in sentencing decisions has survived legal 
challenge. The fourth generation instrument Correctional Offender Management Profiles for 
Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) is used across the United States, to inform sentencing 
decisions as well as offender management. It assesses risk on the basis of 137 factors and was 
developed by a commercial organisation, Northpointe, which makes the algorithm 
proprietary. In State v Loomis (2016)1, Loomis argued that the proprietary nature of COMPAS 
prevented him from challenging the accuracy and validity of the instrument, and that using the 
instrument in sentencing is an improper form of gendered assessment. The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court ruled that the court’s use of the COMPAS risk score as an element (rather 
than the sole factor) in determining Loomis’s sentence did not violate his due process rights to 
be sentenced individually and using accurate information, and by taking gender and race into 
account; a petition to the US Supreme Court to challenge this decision was denied.2 
 
Predictive Validity and the Meaning of ‘Risk’ 
 
Another key concern with the use of risk assessment in sentencing is the imperfect predictive 
validity (see also Fazel, Chapter 11 in this volume). Risk is by definition uncertain: it may or 
may not materialise into harm. This is reflected in the probability scores that are generated by 
modern risk assessments, which convey information about the average recidivism rate for a 
                                                 
1 State v Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016) 
2 COMPAS does not use race as an explicit risk factor. The instrument received criticism after journalistic 
platform ProPublica published an article showing that black defendants were more likely to receive false positive 
(high risk) scores than white defendants, while white defendants were more likely to receive false negative (low 
risk) scores (Angwin et al. 2016). Overall accuracy was the same for white and black defendants. Others have 
criticised these findings for their limited assessment of fairness, as other criteria showed no racial disparities 
(Flores, Bechtel and Lowenkamp 2016; Chouldechova 2017). 
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group of offenders who share the same characteristics (included in the instrument) as the 
individual subjected to the assessment. Yet, often, these raw probability scores are reduced to 
simplistic categories of low, moderate or high risk in communication to the courts. Predictive 
validity refers to a risk assessment instrument’s ability to correctly assess the likelihood of 
(serious) reoffending.  
Any decision based on a risk score has the potential to make a wrong assumption about 
actual recidivism: the so called false positives (i.e. a prediction of reoffending when this 
would not have occurred) and false negatives (i.e. a prediction of no reoffending when this 
will occur). The error rate of risk assessment is substantial; while the most commonly used 
risk assessment instruments appear fairly accurate at predicting low risk of offending, they 
have a high rate of false positives (Fazel et al. 2012). The most commonly used measure of 
predictive accuracy for risk assessment instruments is the area under the Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) curve. The area under the curve (AUC) can be interpreted as the 
probability that a randomly selected recidivist has a higher risk score than a randomly selected 
non-recidivist. Most risk instruments have an AUC value between 0.66 and 0.78 (Singh, 
Grann and Fazel 2011), which means that they have moderate discriminatory power.3 Even 
given the AUC value of a particular instrument, the likelihood of false positives and false 
negatives varies depending on the cut-off score that is used to make decisions about risk: the 
higher the cut-off score on an instrument for labelling an offender as high-risk, the greater the 
specificity (i.e. positive predictive value), but the lower the sensitivity of detecting true 
positives. In practice, users of risk assessment instruments are likely to cast a wider net, which 
classifies a relatively substantial proportion of offenders as high risk, in order to maximise 
sensitivity and avoid that any high risk offenders go undetected; this also means that, 
inadvertently, a considerable proportion of offenders is inaccurately labelled as high risk (i.e. 
false positives. Of course, this may have consequences at the sentencing stage (see also 
Hester, Chapter 12 in this volume).  
A further consideration is the reliability of the information that is fed into the measure: ‘no 
risk-assessment device can be better than the data from which it is constructed’ (Gottfredson 
and Moriarty 2006: 183). Instruments with low levels of transparency into how scores are 
calculated can be criticised because the validity cannot be checked or challenged; this is one 
of the greatest problems with machine learning approaches to risk assessment (see also ‘The 
Future of Risk Assessment’ below and Hannah-Moffat, Chapter 10 in this volume).  
                                                 
3 A systematic review on the reporting of predictive validity in violence risk assessment studies found that AUC 
results were often misinterpreted (Singh, Desmarais and Van Dorn 2013). 
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Other validity problems are that risk estimates do not include an assessment of the 
potential effect of specific sentences (or interventions as part of a sentence) on recidivism and 
that the sample used for developing an instrument may not be representative for the 
population on which it is used (Starr 2014). Fazel et al. (2012: 5) conclude, ‘risk assessment 
tools in their current form can only be used to roughly classify individuals at the group level, 
and not to safely determine criminal prognosis in an individual case.’ The use of group data to 
make predictions about individual cases is not only empirically flawed, but also ethically 
dubious (Hart, Michie and Cooke 2007; Netter 2007; Starr 2014; cf. Skeem and Monahan 
2011), as it holds individuals responsible for group-based tendencies. 
Finally, one should also consider the type of outcome that is predicted and its practical 
relevance. ‘Risk’ can have a variety of meanings: it can mean the likelihood of parole 
violation, re-arrest, a criminal charge, reconviction, re-imprisonment or any specific type or 
seriousness of re-offending. Instruments that were developed using official statistics 
(particularly arrests and parole violations) partly reflect police and probation practices rather 
than actual (harmful) behaviour (Harcourt 2007). Regardless, validation studies use a wide 
variety of outcome measures so it needs to be questioned to what extent they measure the 
intended construct. It is also important to understand that someone who falls into a ‘high risk’ 
category does not necessarily pose a great risk of serious offending (or causing serious harm); 
in other words, risk does not equal dangerousness. Many conceive of ‘dangerousness’ as a 
function of risk (in terms of likelihood) and harm.4 The meaning of dangerousness may vary 
across jurisdictions and is fluid over time, depending partly on public and political concerns 
about crime at any given time (Pratt 1995). Post 1970, dangerousness has come to be 
understood as mainly (risk of) violent and sexual offending, which is also reflected in current 
legislation in England and Wales, discussed under ‘Assessments of Dangerousness and 
Indeterminate Sentences’ below. Given the low prevalence rate of serious violent offending, it 
is inherently difficult to predict its occurrence (but much easier to predict its non-occurrence, 
see Hester, Chapter 12 in this volume). Many instruments therefore are validated to predict 
general or any violent offending (including threats or attempts of violence without bodily 
harm) (Singh, Grann and Fazel 2011; Yang, Wong and Coid 2010). Overall, then, ‘high risk’ 
can be easily misinterpreted if decision-makers are not given information on error rates and 
the nature of the outcome that is predicted. 
 
                                                 
4 But see Slobogin (2012), who defines dangerousness as simply the likelihood of reoffending. 
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Discrimination and Responsibilisation 
 
Some argue in favour of risk assessment for reasons of fair treatment: it can – to some extent 
– eliminate judicial bias, enhance transparency in sentencing, and prevent unnecessary 
intervention and the infliction of harm on low-risk offenders. However, there are also 
concerns that risk-based sentencing results in sentencing disparity and reproduces or even 
exacerbates social inequality. There are various possible explanatory mechanisms for such an 
effect. First, risk assessment instruments may have mixed predictive validity for different 
groups, such as men and women, or individuals with a different ethnic background (Skeem, 
Monahan and Lowenkamp 2016; Raynor and Lewis 2011; cf. Skeem and Lowenkamp 2016). 
Risk and need factors may vary across groups, operate differently and be experienced 
differently (e.g. Hannah-Moffat 2016; Van Voorhis et al. 2010). Secondly, the predictive 
fairness of risk-based sentencing may be compromised because factors that are correlated 
with recidivism are also correlated with ethnicity and social class (e.g. employment status, 
marital status, education level, and substance abuse), which has to be understood in a socio-
economic and historical context (Holtfreter, Reisig and Morash 2004; Van Eijk 2017). For 
instance, the correlation between criminal history and race may not only reflect differential 
participation of ethnic minorities in crime, but also differential selection through 
disproportionately high arrest, prosecution and conviction rates (Harcourt 2007).  
 
Use of marital status, employment, education, family status, and residential stability as 
factors in prediction instruments systematically disadvantages minority defendants. The 
social and economic disadvantages that disproportionately afflict blacks and Hispanics 
in America are partly the products of historic and ongoing discrimination and bias. 
(Tonry 2014: 173) 
 
If risk assessment is employed to send high-risk offenders to prison, it is likely to simply 
reinforce destructive cycles of incarceration and associated social disadvantage (Van Eijk 
2017; Hannah-Moffat 2016). As a result, the risk assessments will help to sustain the 
inequalities that are root causes of many forms of delinquent behaviour, including exclusion 
from society and economic disadvantage. 
Finally, risk assessment may be criticised for depoliticising issues of social justice. 
Forward-looking, risk-based sentencing diverts attention away from underlying causes of 
crime and instead holds individuals fully responsible not only for past crimes, but also for 
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their future risk (known as ‘responsibilisation’, which transfers the responsibility for solving 
problems from state authorities to individuals). In other words, one might easily confuse the 
causes of crime with the causes of individual differences in crime. In risk assessment, the 
terms ‘needs’ and ‘dynamic risk’ are used interchangeably, which devalues the importance of 
non-criminogenic needs (alterable circumstances which are not directly, empirically linked to 
recidivism). Valid needs, then, are only those that are potential targets of risk reduction, 
because they have a statistically proven association with offending. While these needs are 
often connected to structural constraints (including poverty), they are presented as individual 
deficits, which are also an individual’s responsibility to overcome (Hannah-Moffat 2016; 
Holtfreter et al. 2004; Van Eijk 2017). This bypasses political debate about what should be 
done about crime – apart from incarcerating high-risk offenders – and to what extent it is a 
political and societal responsibility to collectively reduce risk factors of crime. 
 
The Role of Risk Assessment in Sentencing 
 
We can roughly distinguish two functions of risk assessment in sentencing: risk assessment 
can be used either to limit (judicial) discretion, or to inform how discretion in sentencing may 
be used. Instances of the former function are primarily observed in jurisdictions that make use 
of sentencing guidelines, which can contain an implicit form of risk assessment in themselves, 
or alternatively can contain provisions that require judges to make a risk assessment and apply 
it in a certain way. Risk assessment can also be used to inform judges (as well as parole 
boards) in more discretionary decisions regarding type and length of sentences. These various 
uses of risk assessment are discussed in turn, and illustrated with typical examples. 
 
Limiting Discretion: Sentencing Guidelines  
 
Sentencing guidelines have a more or less prescriptive function in sentence calibration, not 
only in relation to offence seriousness, but also in relation to risk. They can be regarded as a 
form of risk assessment in themselves as they normally incorporate at least offence history in 
the recommendation of a sentence (range); they may also – additionally – explicitly require or 
advise the consideration of risk in sentencing decisions. Most guidelines states in the US 
employ a sentencing grid, which recommends sentence options based on two criteria: the 
seriousness of the current offence and an offender’s prior record. The length of a prison 
sentence can vary greatly depending on the number of prior convictions (Frase and Hester 
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2015). Sentencing grids, in particular, limit judicial discretion in the sense that prior 
convictions are uniformly associated with higher recommended sentences; therefore, the 
presence of this particular risk factor is not subject to much interpretation (see also Roberts 
and Frase, Chapter 9 in this volume).5 It has been argued that such sentencing grids function 
more to standardise judicial practice in line with logics of control and incapacitation than as a 
form of risk assessment or actuarial justice (Rothschild-Elyassi, Koehler and Simon in press). 
Matters are more complicated when sentencing guidelines include the recommendation to 
consider risk assessment in the sentencing decision, primarily in order to divert low-risk 
offenders from prison. 
Risk assessments integrate more information than prior records into a calculation of 
recidivism risk and judges have the risk scores available in addition to sentencing guidelines. 
The 2011 Guiding Principles report by a National Working Group on the use of offender risk 
and needs assessment information at sentencing outlines how risk assessments should be used, 
with the ultimate aim to reduce recidivism in a cost-effective way (Casey, Warren and Elek 
2011). Importantly, the guiding principles explicitly separate the punitive aim of sentencing 
from crime reduction aims and state that risk and needs assessments (RNAs) should only be 
used for the latter purpose. That is, the outcomes of RNAs should not be used to make 
sentences more or less punitive, which is in line with the judgement in Malenchik v Indiana 
(2010)6, in which the Supreme Court of Indiana found that risk assessment scores should not 
be interpreted as mitigating or aggravating factors in determination of the length of a 
sentence. Rather, the Court recommended that RNAs should be used primarily for deciding 
whether to suspend (part of) a sentence and for assigning programmes, treatment or specific 
requirements. Therefore, the guiding principles only apply to offenders who are probation-
eligible according to state sentencing guidelines. While (additional) probation or treatment 
requirements may not be intentionally punitive, it should be kept in mind that they may 
certainly be experienced as such (see, for example, Durnescu 2011; Van Ginneken and Hayes 
2017).  
The state of Virginia has gone further than most other states in its use of risk 
assessment at the sentencing stage, which they introduced to offset the anticipated increase in 
the occupation of prison beds resulting from truth-in-sentencing legislation and the abolition 
of parole. The Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission (2011) developed a Nonviolent 
                                                 
5 In United States v Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) the US Supreme Court ruled that federal mandatory sentencing 
guidelines were unconstitutional, which consequently made sentencing guidelines advisory. 
6 Malenchik v Indiana, 928 N.E.2d 564 (Ind. 2010) 
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Risk Assessment (NVRA) that has been used since 2002 to identify drug and property 
offenders with the lowest risk of committing further crimes and recommend them for 
diversion from prison. A few interesting observations can be made about Virginia’s 
experience with risk assessment at sentencing. First, the instrument calculates a score 
primarily based on offence history and current offence characteristics. The only offender 
characteristics are age (lower age yields higher risk score) and gender (males receive higher 
scores). Employment and marital status were included initially, but excluded from the most 
recent versions due to difficulty with verification and negligible loss of predictive validity 
(Ostrom and Kauder 2012). The NVRA is therefore a rather straightforward actuarial 
instrument. Secondly, there is substantial discrepancy in the extent to which recommendations 
from the NVRA are followed by judges. Under half of the eligible offenders who scored ‘low 
risk’ actually received an alternative sanction (Garrett, Jakubow and Monahan 2018), 
including diversion from prison to jail. The same study found that there was substantial 
variation across the circuit court districts in the imposition of alternative sentences. The 
majority of judges rated the availability of alternative interventions within their jurisdiction as 
inadequate (Monahan, Metz and Garrett 2018). Thus, while Virginia achieved its aim of 
diverting at least 25% of the lowest risk drug and property offenders from prison, there is no 
consistent application (Garrett, Jakubow and Monahan 2018).  
Increasingly, other states also report risk and needs information at the sentencing 
stage, typically as part of the pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report. Most states that conduct 
RNA prior to sentencing use state-specific instruments, but the LSI-R, LS/CMI and COMPAS 
are also used (Elek, Warren and Casey 2015; Vera Institute of Justice 2011). Most of these 
instruments are much more elaborate than Virginia’s NVRA. For example, the Indiana Risk 
Assessment System requires probation officers to score criminal history; education, 
employment and financial situation; family and social support; neighbourhood problems; 
substance abuse; peer associations; and criminal attitudes and behavioural patterns (Elek, 
Warren and Casey 2015). Overall, the US does not attach binding consequences to specific 
levels of risk, but sentencing guidelines recommend diversionary sanctions for offenders with 
low risk scores, while (lengthy) prison sentences are reserved for offenders with high risk 
scores. Yet, despite clear directions on how judges should interpret and apply risk scores, the 
research discussed above shows that judges are still likely to use their discretion to deviate 
from the recommendations on using risk scores. 
 




The serious consequences of being deemed a ‘high-risk offender’ are most aptly illustrated 
with a discussion of the practice of indeterminate sentencing in England and Wales. 
Sentencing guidelines in England and Wales are developed by the Sentencing Council and 
must be followed by judges, unless it is not in the interests of justice to do so (Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009, s.125(1)). They tend to offer a fairly wide range of penalty options, the 
choice of which is guided by considerations of culpability, harm, aggravating factors 
(including relevant previous offences), and mitigating factors. Of particular interest regarding 
these guidelines, is the assessment of dangerousness that judges must make for serious 
specified offences (Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.224), which can result in an indeterminate 
sentence of life imprisonment. 
In cases where judges have to make a discretionary assessment of whether to impose a 
life sentence or extended sentence for certain violent or sexual offences, they do so under the 
dangerousness provisions outlined in the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003 (s.229). In effect, 
this appraisal of dangerousness constitutes a risk assessment. A life sentence must be imposed 
by the court if it is available for the committed offence and ‘the court considers that the 
seriousness of the offence, or of the offence and one or more offences associated with it, is 
such as to justify the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life’ (s.225(2)). The judge 
assesses dangerousness by consideration of: the nature and circumstances of the offence, the 
nature and circumstances of previous offences, any pattern of behaviour including the 
aforementioned offence(s), and any information about the offender (s.229). This information 
should normally be included in a pre-sentence report prepared by the National Probation 
Service (NPS). Such a report also includes an analysis of the likelihood of reoffending and 
risk of harm.7 The courts may also consider psychiatric reports and other expert opinion.  
England and Wales have – for Western European standards – an exceptionally high 
proportion of offenders sentenced to indeterminate prison sentences. At the end of 2017, 
7,144 prisoners were serving a life sentence, which accounts for 11% of their prison 
population (Ministry of Justice 2018).8 Life imprisonment is the mandatory sentence for 
offenders over 21 convicted of murder, it is a discretionary maximum sentence for offenders 
                                                 
7 See PI 04/2016 ‘Determining Pre Sentence Reports’. In practice, this involves a combination of actuarial and 
structured risk assessments (e.g. Offender Group Reconviction Scores, OGRS, and Offender Assessment 
System, OASys).  The NPS also allocates cases based on risk for future management purposes, using the 
(actuarial) Risk of Serious Recidivism tool (Robinson 2017).  
8 Included in this number are 60 prisoners with a whole life order, which means they will not be eligible for 
parole at any point, with the exception of release on compassionate grounds by the Home Secretary. 
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over 21 convicted of serious offences such as manslaughter, rape, and armed robbery, and an 
automatic sentence for a second listed offence under conditions outlined in s.122 in the Legal 
Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act (LASPOA) 2012 (inserted as s.224A into 
CJA 2003). At sentencing, the judge also imposes a minimum term that the offender has to 
serve in prison before they can be considered for parole. At the end of 2017, there were 2,014 
prisoners (28%) with a life sentence with an expired tariff (Ministry of Justice 2018). 
Released life prisoners remain on licence for the remainder of their natural life, which means 
they can be recalled to prison if this is deemed necessary to protect the public. 
 
Imprisonment for Public Protection: A Failed Experiment 
 
The costs of guideline-mandated indeterminate sentences for high-risk offenders are high, 
which was particularly evident from the brief experiment in England and Wales with another 
type of indeterminate sentence specifically for ‘dangerous offenders’: Imprisonment for 
Public Protection (IPP). The IPP sentence was introduced with the CJA 2003 (s.225) and 
abolished with LASPOA 2012 (s.123). In December 2017, there were still 3,029 prisoners 
serving an IPP sentence, most of whom (87%) with an expired tariff (Ministry of Justice 
2018).  
The IPP experiment aptly demonstrates the difficulties with operationalising risk. 
Initially, there was no minimum offence seriousness threshold for imposing an IPP sentence 
(apart from commission of a listed offence) and courts had to make the judgement whether an 
offender was ‘dangerous’, i.e. ‘a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm 
occasioned by the commission by him [sic] of further such offences’ (CJA 2003, s. 229(1)). 
The original legislation contained a presumption of dangerousness, stating that ‘the court must 
assume that there is such a risk’ if an offender had committed one of the listed offences. In 
their risk assessment, courts were obliged to take into account information about the offence 
and were allowed to also take into account information about the offender and patterns of 
behaviour including the offence. The courts would normally have information from the 
structured risk assessment OASys at their disposal, but there were no guidelines or case law 
on how to derive conclusions about dangerousness from these scores (Ashworth and Zedner 
2014: 126). Furthermore, the validity of OASys scores was found questionable by a report 
from the Chief Inspector of Prisons and Probation (HMCIP 2008). As a consequence of the 
wide net of risk cast with the CJA 2003, offenders were given relatively low commensurate 
tariffs but nevertheless faced extended, indeterminate sentences (Jacobson and Hough 2010).  
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The Criminal Justice & Immigration Act 2008 sought to remedy some of the problems with 
proportionality as well as expansion of the prison population by removing the presumption of 
dangerousness and introducing a minimum tariff of two years before an IPP sentence could be 
imposed. LASPOA 2012 abolished the IPP sentence altogether and reduced judicial discretion 




In jurisdictions with greater judicial discretion at sentencing, the use of risk assessment is less 
transparent. In civil law countries, judges are not normally bound by guidelines, but instead 
have to abide by statutory maximum (and sometimes minimum) sentences. As a result, there 
are no instructions on applying risk scores in a specified manner in sentencing; so if and how 
outcomes from risk assessments should be used for sentencing purposes is left to judicial 
discretion. Nevertheless, judges often consider risk assessments in some form in their 
sentencing decisions. While specific preventive policies and measures betray the political 
preoccupation with risk, we can observe a persistence of rehabilitative ideals among judges 
and criminal justice professionals (McNeill et al. 2009).  
Common practice is to convey judgements of risk in the form of pre-sentence 
(investigation) reports, which are presented in court. Pre-sentence investigation (PSI) reports 
are widely used and tend to convey information about risk and criminogenic needs of 
offenders. In these reports, risk assessments tend to be based on structured and clinical risk 
assessments, which may incorporate actuarial elements. Research on PSI reports in Belgium, 
Sweden and Denmark suggests that professional and clinical judgements are most important 
in determining risk; there is little evidence of the use of actuarial risk assessment at the 
sentencing stage (Wandall 2010; Persson and Svensson 2012; Beyens and Scheirs 2010). In 
Canada, on the other hand, structured actuarial risk assessment is a dominant feature of PSIs 
(Hannah-Moffat and Maurutto 2010). 
Even when risk is clearly communicated at the sentencing stage in PSI reports, it is not 
necessarily interpreted in the same straightforward manner as is the case with sentencing grids 
and guidelines (i.e. sentence enhancements for prior records or diversion from prison in the 
case of low risk). In the Netherlands, for example, judges appear to respond to risk with a 
more rehabilitative than incapacitative approach, which may even suggest that criminogenic 
needs are interpreted as mitigating rather than aggravating factors. A quasi-experimental 
study (Van Wingerden, Van Wilsem and Moerings 2014) found that Dutch judges were, 
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contrary to expectations, more likely to sentence offenders identified as ‘high-risk’ by a 
structured risk-based PSI report to less controlling sentences (i.e. a suspended sentence 
without special conditions) than offenders with the same risk who did not have a PSI report at 
the time of sentencing. In line with expectations, offenders identified as low-risk prior to 
sentencing were more likely to receive diverting types of sentences (i.e. suspended sentence 
or community sentence) than their counterparts without risk assessment. 
 
Beyond Punishment: Preventive Detention and Safety Measures 
 
There are provisions for risk-based sentencing that avoid the engagement with normative 
issues of punishment through deployment of what Hart (1968) called a definitional stop: if it 
is not called punishment, it does not have to be justified as such. This is problematic because 
moral questions and issues cannot be simply ‘defined out of existence’ (Kleinig 1973: 13). 
Many continental European jurisdictions have risk-related sanctions or measures that can be 
imposed at the sentencing stage in addition to or instead of purely offence-related penalties 
(Van der Wolf and Herzog-Evans 2015). The integration of such measures in penal law makes 
them technically distinct from safety measures created within civil law and they also differ 
from provisions for safety measures after a sentence has been served: but both of these suffer 
from some of the same problems discussed below, particularly with respect to the 
proportionality of suffering inflicted. For example, many US states have the option to detain 
serious sexual offenders indefinitely under civil commitment laws, when they have a ‘mental 
abnormality’ that predisposes them to sexual violence (Kansas v Hendricks [1997]).9 The 
penal safety measures imposed at sentencing require a prospective judgement of risk rather 
than an assessment of current risk to determine safety of release and therefore do not take into 
account a possible reduction of risk over time. 
As these sanctions are not technically punishments – even though they are imposed 
only when an offence has been committed – they bypass retributive concerns of 
proportionality; instead they are intended primarily for public protection. This means that 
individuals can be deprived of their liberty for much longer than would normally be 
considered proportionate to the seriousness of the offence. These types of measures should 
not be confused with those for offenders who are not held criminally responsible for their acts 
(not discussed in this chapter). De Keijser (2011) has argued elsewhere that the difference 
                                                 
9 Kansas v Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) 
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between punishment and measure is merely semantic in relation to the infliction of suffering: 
while punishment involves the intended infliction of suffering, any suffering inflicted by a 
measure is unintended. Regardless, the deprivation of liberty – unlikely to be the only 
deprivation resulting from a measure – is inevitably accompanied by pain. There are many 
examples of such measures which are preventive in name and punitive in terms of subjective 
experience (see Ashworth and Zedner [2014] for examples and critiques). The section below 
discusses two examples from the Netherlands of penal measures involving liberty deprivation, 
which provides an interesting case study given that the measures target two very different 
categories of high-risk offenders: (1) serious violent and sexual offenders and (2) persistent 
(low-level) offenders. 
The first measure is terbeschikkingstelling (TBS, entrustment order). Of particular 
interest for the purpose of this discussion is the version of TBS which can be imposed in 
addition to a regular term of imprisonment, meaning the offender is held (at least partially) 
criminally responsible.10 TBS extends a sentence beyond the severity proportionate to the 
offence, although a TBS order will be served in a TBS-institution rather than regular prison; 
this is not the case in France, for example, where safety detention is executed in prison (Van 
der Wolf and Herzog-Evans 2015). The TBS order incapacitates the offender for its duration, 
but also entails treatment. The offender may decline treatment, but this would considerably 
reduce their chances of release. TBS may only be imposed for crimes with a maximum 
statutory punishment of at least four years, when a psychiatric disorder (to some extent) led to 
the commission of the offence, and when there is a risk of recidivism. Its duration is limited to 
a maximum of four years for non-violent offenders, although in practice the vast majority of 
offenders given a TBS order are sentenced for violent offences. For violent offenders, TBS 
can be extended indefinitely with two-year increments upon review. The decision to impose a 
TBS order relies primarily on a psychiatric report provided to the court, which is still heavily 
based on clinical diagnosis and risk assessment. Risk assessments during a TBS order, for 
example to determine temporary release, increasingly make use of structured risk assessment 
tools, such as the Dutch HKT-R and the international HCR20V3.  
The second measure is Inrichting Stelselmatige Daders (ISD, Institution for Persistent 
Offenders), which is a determinate custodial measure of a maximum of two years, imposed 
instead of a regular prison sentence. It targets offenders who frequently commit less serious 
crimes, and are seen to be responsible for a disproportionately high number of offences. ISD-
                                                 




prisoners are incarcerated on dedicated ISD-wings, within regular prison facilities. The ISD 
measure is best understood as a measure to protect society of nuisance, rather than danger. 
Similar to TBS, ISD imposes a sanction that is more severe than would be justified solely on 
retributive grounds. It can be imposed at the request of the public prosecutor, if a defendant 
has been convicted at least three times in the preceding five years. The judicial decision is 
further informed by a pre-sentence report, including risk assessment, provided by the 
Probation Service. Apart from the public protection rationale underlying ISD, it is also 
thought that the duration of the measure is potentially more effective at addressing problems 
of addiction than repetitive short sentences; there is some evidence that the ISD-measure is 
effective at reducing crime and recidivism (Tollenaar, Van der Laan and Van der Heijden 
2014; 2018).  
 
The Future of Risk Assessment 
 
The use of risk assessment in sentencing is not a new development, but its function and form 
have changed in the last few decades. While risk assessment is still used at the back-door of 
sentencing to determine safety of release, it is increasingly used at the front-door of 
sentencing. Here, it has two primary (and to some extent, mutually exclusive) functions: (1) to 
limit judicial discretion by attaching prescribed or advised sentences to offenders’ risk and (2) 
to inform judicial discretion, mainly in the form of pre-sentence investigation reports 
containing risk/needs assessments. There is no uniformity in how risk assessment is used and 
even the consequences attached to it. It can serve to identify low-risk offenders who can be 
safely diverted from prison; to identify high-risk offenders who should be given indeterminate 
sentences or safety measures; or to determine the most appropriate type of sentence or 
conditions. Actuarial assessment has gained some ground but the remaining influence of 
professional judgement should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, policies and legislation 
for dangerous offenders are illustrative of increasing risk aversion and, in effect, limit judicial 
discretion. This final section reflects on two recent developments that may signal further 
changes in the shape and methods of risk-based sentencing: (1) the criminalisation of risk and 
(2) technological advancements, including machine learning and neurological risk assessment. 
While the preceding discussion has focused on risk assessment as part of the 
sentencing process and in determining release decisions, there is a trend towards an 
assumption of risk with certain activities. This concerns primarily pre-inchoate or preparatory 
offences, thought to indicate risk of further offending that has the potential to cause great 
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harm. Pre-inchoate offences mainly concern activities associated with terrorism (e.g. 
encouragement of terrorism; engaging in any conduct in preparation for acts of terrorism; see 
the UK’s Terrorism Act 2006).11 Characteristic of these offences is that activities that are not 
harmful an sich are seen – in combination with circumstances and a degree of interpretation 
about intent – as carrying enough risk for harm as to warrant severe punishment (the 
maximum penalty for the preparatory activities under the Terrorism Act 2006 is life 
imprisonment). This fits with a shift from post-crime to pre-crime (Zedner 2007), whereby 
criminal justice resources and responses are increasingly oriented towards the pre-emption of 
crime, rather than the reaction to crime. Such a criminalisation of risk obscures assumptions 
about risk factors and how they are related to actual harm: the problem of imperfect predictive 
validity is completely disregarded when behaviour indicative of a high risk of harm is itself 
illegal.  
Technological advancements, similarly, raise new questions about fairness, even 
though they may improve the accuracy of predictions. There are two particularly noteworthy 
developments in relation to the technology of risk prediction: machine learning algorithms 
and neurological assessments. Machine learning techniques have enabled the search for 
instruments that can detect more complex patterns than traditional regression-based 
instruments (Berk and Bleich 2013; Berk et al. 2009). This means that the algorithm that turns 
input information into a risk score is highly complex (a ‘black box’), and consequently cannot 
be used to inform interventions and monitor progress in the way that third and fourth 
generation instruments can be used. There is not yet agreement on whether machine learning 
techniques are more accurate at predicting recidivism (Tollenaar and Van der Heijden 2013; 
Berk and Bleich 2013; for a discussion of the impact of machine learning on the predictive 
fairness of risk assessment, see Hannah-Moffat, Chapter 10 in this volume).  
 A second development is the potential of neurological assessment to inform 
assessments of dangerousness. While the study of brain function in relation to offending is 
still in its infancy and has not yet widely penetrated the court room (although, see Catley and 
Claydon 2016; Denno 2015; Gaudet and Marchant 2016), recent brain imaging developments 
could potentially be used for the purpose of ‘neuropredicting’ violence and offending more 
generally (Aggarwal 2009; Gkotsi and Gasser 2016; Glenn and Raine 2014; Nadelhoffer and 
                                                 
11 Although, as Ashworth and Zedner (2014) note, the offence of ‘meeting a child following sexual grooming’ in 
English law can be seen as a pre-inchoate offence. It penalises a person who intentionally meets or travels to 
meet a minor with the intention of doing something that would constitute the commission of an offence (Sexual 
Offences Act 2003, s.15). 
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Sinnot-Armstrong 2012). For example, reduced functioning in the frontal lobe is associated 
with antisocial and violent behaviour (Yang and Raine 2009). While most evidence is cross-
sectional in nature, there are some studies that have successfully used neuro-assessment to 
predict re-arrest and violent offending (Aharoni et al. 2013; Pardini et al. 2014). Nevertheless, 
the brain is a product of complex biosocial interactions and there is a danger of reductionism 
and stigmatisation if we rely on ‘brain data’ to predict future offending (Gkotsi and Gasser 
2016). So far, however, research suggests that neurological evidence of brain abnormalities 
has mostly been interpreted as diminished culpability in sentencing decisions, rather than as 
an indication of future risk (Catley and Claydon 2016; Denno 2015). This, again, suggests that 
the discretionary use of risk assessment does not at this time have a uniformly ‘aggravating’ 
impact on sentencing decisions. Yet, given the volatile nature and political sensitivity of 
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